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Abstract
This paper analyzes the growth eﬀects of competition in a product-
cycle model where R&D firms both innovate and imitate and house-
holds are subject to non-diversifiable risk. I prove that product market
competition promotes growth when the initial level of competition is
high enough. In contrast to the earlier product-cycle models with di-
versifiable risk, I show also the following. Some positive profits are
necessary for technological change. The larger the proportion of in-
dustries subject to price competition, the slower economic growth.
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1 Introduction
This paper considers the growth and welfare eﬀects of competition when
households cannot wholly diversify their investment risk and economic growth
is characterized by product cycles as follows. Through the development of
new products, an innovator achieves a temporary advantage earning monopoly
profits. This advantage ends when an imitator succeeds in copying the inno-
vation, enters the market and starts competing with the innovator.
Product cycle models start from Segerstrom (1991), who assumes that
(i) incumbents and outsiders have the same costs of innovation, and (ii)
households eliminate investment risk wholly by diversification. Assumption
(i) leads to leapfrogging: innovations will always be performed by outsiders
and the current industry leaders will be wholly replaced. To eliminate this
unrealistic outcome, Aghion et al. (1997, 2001) construct models where tech-
nological laggards must first catch up with the leading-edge technology be-
fore battling “neck-to-neck” for technological leadership in the future. They
represent competition by the elasticity of substitution between firms’ prod-
ucts and show that competition has in general a positive eﬀect on economic
growth. Mukoyama (2003) constructs a model in which only leaders can con-
duct next-round innovation, while outsiders can become leaders by imitation.
He represents competition by the relative proportion of competing industries
and shows that competition very commonly promotes economic growth.
The three papers above are based on Segerstrom’s assumption (ii) of
full diversification. Wa¨lde (1999a, 1999b) shows that with non-diversifiable
risk investment decisions are made by households rather than firms, and the
equilibrium conditions diﬀer substantially. To examine competition policy
with non-diversifiable risk, I extend Wa¨lde’s one-industry growth model for
an economy with many industries and incorporate Mukoyama’s (2003) as-
sumptions on imitation and cumulative technology into it. The model of this
study is therefore characterized as follows:
(i) Labor is homogeneous and inelastically supplied. It is used in innovation,
imitation or the production of the intermediate goods.
(ii) Competitive firms produce the consumption good from a great number
of intermediate goods according to Cobb-Douglas technology.
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(iii) Firms’ products are imperfect substitutes. A successful innovator of
a new technology crowds out all products made with old technology
and becomes a monopolistic producer until its technology is imitated.
A successful imitator starts producing a substitute for the innovator’s
product and establishes an innovation race with the incumbent produc-
ers. Imitation is necessary for an outsider to become an innovator.
(iv) R&D firms finance their expenditure by issuing shares. The households
save only in these shares. Each R&D firm distributes its profit among
those who had financed it in proportion to their investment in the firm.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 con-
sider firms in production and R&D. Section 4 examines households deciding
on saving. Section 5 considers the eﬀects of competition.
2 Production
I assume a great number of intermediate-good industries that are placed
over the limit [0, 1]. Industry j ∈ [0, 1] contains intermediate-good firms
κ = 1, ..., aj. The representative consumption-good firm makes its output y
from the products of all intermediate-good firms through technology
log y =
∫ 1
0
log[Bjxj]dj, xj =
[
a
−1/ε
j
aj∑
κ=1
x
1−1/ε
jκ
]ε/(ε−1)
,
ε > 1, (1)
where Bj is the productivity parameter in industry j, aj the number of firms
in industry j, xj the quantity of intermediate good j, xjκ the output of firm
κ in industry j, and ε the elasticity of substitution between the products in
the same industry.1 The consumption-good firm maximizes its profit
Πc
.
= Py −
∫
j∈[0,1]
aj∑
κ=1
pjκxjκdj
by its inputs xj, taking the output price P and the input prices {pjκ} as
fixed. I normalize total consumption expenditure Py at unity. Because the
1With the specification (1), the price pj for the composite product of industry j will (in
the symmetric equilibrium pjκ = pj1) be independent of the number of producers in that
industry, aj . Otherwise, the eﬀect of aj on pj would excessively complicate the analysis.
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consumption-good firm is subject to constant returns to scale, we then obtain
Py = 1, Πc = 0, pjxj = 1 and pj =
[
1
aj
aj∑
κ=1
p1−εjκ
]1/(1−ε)
for all j,
xjκ =
∂pj
∂pjκ
xj =
1
aj
(
pj
pjκ
)ε
xj =
1
aj
pε−1j p
−ε
jκ for all j and κ, (2)
where pj is the price of the composite product xj.
I assume that all intermediate-good firms produce one unit of their out-
put from one labor unit. Technological change is random. I assume that a
successful innovator in industry j makes a perfect substitute for intermediate
good j that is composed of the outputs all incumbent firms with older tech-
nology in industry j.2 The innovator’s profit is Πj1 = (pj1−w)xj1, where pj1
is its output price, xj1 its output (= labor input) and w is the wage.
The innovator’s product provides exactly the constant μ > 1 times as
many services as the intermediate good of earlier generation. Firm κ of
earlier generation earns the profit Πojκ = (p
o
jκ−w)x
o
jκ, where p
o
jκ is its output
price and xojκ its output. The innovator pushes the old firms out of the market
by choosing its price pj1 so that these earn no profit, Π
o
jκ = 0 and p
o
jκ = w.
This and (2) yield pj1/μ = p
o
j = p
o
jκ = w, the mark-up rule pj1 = μw and the
innovator’s output and profit as follows:
xj = xj1 = 1/pj1 = 1/(μw) and
Πj1 = (pj1 − w)xj1 = (1− 1/μ)pj1xj1 = 1− 1/μ
.
= Π for aj = 1. (3)
The innovator is the first leader (i.e. the first incumbent producer) in
industry j. A successful imitator of the state-of-art good is able to make a
close substitute for the product of the innovator. Thus with each imitation,
the number of leaders and products increases by one. I assume that all leaders
1, ..., aj in industry j behave in Bertrand manner, taking each other’s prices
as given. Given (1) and (2), leader κ in industry j maximizes its profit
πjκ = pjκxjκ − wxjκ = (pjκ − w)xjκ, (4)
by its price pxjκ, assuming that the prices pjı for the other leaders ı = κ
in industry j are kept constant. It therefore sets the wage w equal to the
2This assumption is in line with technology (1), because xj = xj1 for aj = 1.
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marginal product of labor. Noting (2), this leads to the first-order condition
∂πjκ
∂pjκ
= xjκ + (pjκ − w)
[
∂xjκ
∂pjκ
+
∂xjκ
∂pj
∂pj
∂pjκ
]
= xjκ + (pjκ − w)
[
−ε
xjκ
pjκ
+ (ε− 1)
xjκ
pj
1
aj
(
pj
pjκ
)ε]
= xjκ
{
1 +
(
1−
w
pjκ
)[
−ε+
ε− 1
aj
(
pj
pjκ
)ε−1]}
= 0. (5)
Because the conditions (2) and (5) hold for all κ = 1, ..., aj, the symmetry
pjκ = pj holds throughout all κ. This, (1), (2), (4) and (5) yield
pjκ/w =
{
1− [ε+ (1− ε)/aj]
−1
}−1 .
= Φ(aj), Φ
′ < 0, ajpjκxjκ = 1,
πjκ = (pjκ − w)xjκ =
[
1− Φ(aj)
−1
]
pjκxjκ =
[
1− Φ(aj)
−1
]
/aj,
xj = ajxjκ = 1/pjκ = 1/[Φ(aj)w]. (6)
In order to make product market competition eﬀective, I assume that the
entry of the second leader decreases the first leader’s mark-up:
μ > Φ(2). (7)
If anyone invests in imitative R&D to enter an industry with one leader,
then his prospective profit is πjκ
∣∣
aj=2
, but if he invests (with the same cost)
in imitative R&D to enter an industry with more than two leaders, then his
prospective profit is πjκ
∣∣
aj>2
. Because, by (6), the profit is smaller with more
than two leaders, πjκ
∣∣
aj=2
> πjκ
∣∣
aj>2
, investors invest in imitative R&D only
to enter in one-leader industries. Thus, each industry has one or two leaders.
In one-leader industries the followers imitate and in two-leader industries the
leaders innovate. I denote the set of one-leader industries by Θ ⊂ [0, 1], and
the relative proportion of one-leader (two-leader) industries, α (β) by
α =
∫
j∈Θ
dj, β
.
=
∫
j /∈Θ
dj = 1− α. (8)
Noting aj = 2, (3), (6), (7) and (8), a firm’s profit π (Π) and and total
output xα (xβ) in one-leader (two-leader) industry are given by
Πj
∣∣
j∈Θ
= Π, Πjκ
∣∣
j /∈Θ, aj=2
.
= [1− 1/Φ(2)]/2
.
= π ∈ (0,Π/2), 1/Φ(2) = 1− 2π,
xβ = xj
∣∣
j /∈Θ, aj=2
=
1
Φ(2)w
=
1− 2π
w
> xα = xj
∣∣
j∈Θ
=
1
μw
=
1− Π
w
. (9)
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The higher the elasticity of substitution between the products, ε, the closer
Φ(2) to its lower limit 1 and the smaller π.3 There are now two measures
of competition: a competing firm’s profit π and the relative proportion of
the competing (two-leader) industries, β. The purpose of this paper is to
examine the growth and welfare eﬀects of these.
Noting (1), (3), (8) and (9), and summing up throughout all firms and
industries, one obtains that the employment of labor in production, x, and
total output y are determined as follows:
x
.
= αxα + (1− α)xβ =
ϕ
w
, ϕ(α, π)
.
= (1− Π)α+ (1− α)(1− 2π) < 1− 2π,
∂ϕ
∂α
= 2π − Π < 0,
∂ϕ
∂π
= 2(α− 1) < 0, xα = (1− Π)
x
ϕ
,
∂
∂π
(xα
x
)
> 0,
xβ = (1− 2π)
x
ϕ
> xα,
∂
∂π
(xβ
x
)
= (2π − 1)
x
ϕ2
∂ϕ
∂π
− 2
x
ϕ
= 2(Π− 1)
αx
ϕ2
< 0,
(10)
where x is employment and ϕ = wx wage expenditure. A decrease in a
competing firm’s profit π increases employment x and total wages in pro-
duction, ∂ϕ/∂π < 0. Because competing industries j /∈ Θ employ more
than monopoly industries j ∈ Θ (i.e. xβ > xα), a smaller proportion α of
monopoly industries raises employment x and total wages ϕ in production.
3 Research
There are three types of R&D firms: the first leader (successful innovator),
which I call firm 1, the second leader (successful imitator), which I call firm
2, and followers, which I call firm 0. In two-leader industry j /∈ Θ, firms
1 and 2 innovate and no firm imitates. The technological change of firm
κ ∈ {1, 2} is characterized by a Poisson process qjκ in which the arrival rate
of innovations, Λjκ, is in fixed proportion λ to the firm’s own labor input ljκ:
Λjκ = λljκ for j /∈ Θ and κ ∈ {1, 2}. (11)
During a short time interval dν, there is an innovation dqjκ = 1 in firm κ with
probability Λjκdν, and no innovation dqjκ = 0 with probability 1− Λjκdν.
3In papers that consider imitation in a framework with no growth, it is common to
measure competition directly by the level of profit [Cf. Kanniainen and Stenbacka (2000)].
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In one-leader industry j ∈ Θ, the representative follower (firm 0) imitates
and no firm innovates. The technological change of firm 0 is characterized
by a Poisson process Qj in which the arrival rate of imitations is given by
Γj = γl
1−ς
j0 ℓ
ς
β for j ∈ Θ, (12)
where lj0 is the firm’s own labor input, ℓβ the average labor input to innova-
tive R&D in the economy and γ > 0 and ς ∈ (0, 1) are constants. The input
ℓβ characterizes the immediate spillover of knowledge from innovative to im-
itative R&D.4 During a short time interval dν, there is an imitation dQj = 1
with probability Γjdν, and no imitation dQj = 0 with probability 1− Γjdν.
The invention of a new technology in industry j raises the number of
technology in that industry, tj, by one and the level of productivity, B
tj
j , by
μ > 1. Given this and (10), the average productivity in the economy, B, is a
function of the technologies of all industries, {tk}, as follows:
log B{tk}
.
=
∫ 1
0
log B
tj
j dj, B
tj+1
/
B
tj
j = μ, (13)
where {tk} denotes a vector that consists of tk for all k. The arrival rate of
innovations in industry j /∈ Θ is the sum of the arrival rates of both firms in
the industry, Λj1 + Λj2. The average growth rate of Bj due to technological
change in industry j in the stationary state is then given by
E
[
log B
tj+1
j − log B
tj
j
]
= (Λj1 + Λj2) log μ,
where E is the expectation operator.5 Because only industries j /∈ Θ inno-
vate, then, noting (11), the average growth rate of the average productivity
B in the stationary state is given by
g
.
=
∫
j /∈Θ
E
[
log B
tj+1
j − log B
tj
j
]
dj = (log μ)
∫
j /∈Θ
(Λj1 + Λj2)dj
= λ
∫
j /∈Θ
(lj1 + lj2)dj. (14)
4In the case ς = 0 investment in imitative R&D were subject to constant returns to scale
and there were no equilibrium for a household (see section 4 and Appendix A, especially
equations (45) and (46)). With the spillover eﬀect ς > 0, the average product of labor in
innovative R&D, Γj/lj0, falls with the increase in labor input lj0. This property ensures
that a household has an equilibrium.
5For this, see Aghion and Howitt (1998), p. 59.
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Total employment in R&D is given by
l
.
=
∫
j /∈Θ
(lj1 + lj2)dj +
∫
j∈Θ
ljdj. (15)
There exists a fixed number N of households, each supplying one labor unit.
Total labor supply N is equal to inputs in production, x, and R&D, l:
N = x+ l. (16)
In industry j ∈ Θ firm 0 and in industry j /∈ Θ firms 1 and 2 issue shares
to finance their labor expenditure in R&D. Because the households invest in
these shares, one obtains
N∑
ι=1
Sιj0 = wlj0 for j ∈ Θ,
N∑
ι=1
Sιjκ = wljκ for κ ∈ {1, 2} and j /∈ Θ, (17)
where wlj0 is the imitative expenditure of firm 0 in industry j ∈ Θ, wljκ
the innovative expenditure of firm κ ∈ {1, 2} in industry j /∈ Θ, Sιj0 (Sιjκ)
household ι’s investment in firm 0 in industry j ∈ Θ (firm κ in industry
j /∈ Θ), and
∑N
ι=1 Sιj0
(∑N
ι=1 Sιjκ
)
aggregate investment in firm 0 in industry
j ∈ Θ (firm κ in industry j /∈ Θ). Household ι’s relative investment shares
in the firms are given by
iιj0
.
=
Sιj0
wlj0
for j ∈ Θ; iιjκ
.
=
Sιjκ
wljκ
for j /∈ Θ. (18)
I denote household ι’s income by Aι. Total income throughout all house-
holds ι ∈ {1, ..., N} is then equal to income earned in the production of
consumption goods, Py, and in R&D, wl. Since Py = 1 by (2), this yields
N∑
ι=1
Aι = Py + wl = 1 + wl. (19)
4 Households
The utility for risk-averting household ι ∈ {1, ..., N} from an infinite stream
of consumption beginning at time T is given by
U(Cι, T ) = E
∫ ∞
T
Cσι e
−ρ(ν−T )dν with 0 < σ < 1 and ρ > 0, (20)
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where ν is time, E the expectation operator, Cι the index of consumption, ρ
the rate of time preference and 1/(1−σ) is the constant relative risk aversion.
Because investment in shares in R&D firms is the only form of saving in
the model, the budget constraint of household ι is given by
Aι = PCι +
∫
j∈Θ
Sιj0dj +
∫
j /∈Θ
(Sιj1 + Sιj2)dj, (21)
where Aι is the household’s total income, Cι its consumption, P the consump-
tion price, and Sιj0 (Sιjκ) the household’s investment in firm 0 in industry
j ∈ Θ (firm κ in industry j /∈ Θ). When household ι has financed a success-
ful R&D firm, it acquires the right to the firm’s profit in proportion to its
relative investment share. Thus, I define:
sιjκ household ι’s true profit from firm κ in industry j when the uncertainty
in R&D is taken into account;
iιjκ household ι’s investment share in firm κ in industry j [Cf. (18)];
Πiιjκ household ι’s expected profit from firm κ ∈ {1, 2} in industry j /∈ Θ
after innovation in firm κ have changed the two-leader industry j into
a one-leader industry;
πiιj0 household ι’s expected profit from firm 0 in industry j ∈ Θ after imita-
tion in firm 0 have changed the one-leader industry j into a two-leader
industry.
The changes in the profits of firms in industry j are functions of the
increments (dqj1, dqj2, dQj) of Poisson processes (qj1, qj2, Qj) as follows:
6
dsιjκ = (Πiιjκ − sιjκ)dqjκ − sιjκdqj(ζ =κ) when j /∈ Θ;
dsιj0 = (πiιj0 − sιj0)dQj when j ∈ Θ. (22)
These functions can be explained as follows. If a household invests in leader
κ in industry j /∈ Θ, then, in the advent of a success for that leader, dqjκ = 1,
the amount of its share holdings rises up to Πiιjκ, dsιjκ = Πiιjκ− sιjκ, but in
the advent of success for the other leader ζ = κ, its share holdings in leader
6This extends the idea of Wa¨lde (1999a, 1999b).
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κ fall down to zero, dsιjκ = −sιjκ. If a household invests in imitating firm 0
in industry j ∈ Θ, then, in the advent of a success for the firm, dQj = 1, the
amount of its share holdings rises up to πiιj0, dsιj0 = πiιj0 − sιj0.
Household ι’s total incomeAι consists of its wage income w (the household
supplies one labor unit), its profits sιj1 from the single leader in each industry
j ∈ Θ and its profits sιj1 and sιj2 from the two leaders 1 and 2 in each industry
j /∈ Θ. Given this and (9), one obtains
Aι = w +
∫
j∈Θ
sιj1dj +
∫
j /∈Θ
(sιj1 + sιj2)dj. (23)
Household ι maximizes its utility (20) by its investment, {Sιj0} for j ∈ Θ
and {Sιj1, Sιj2} for j /∈ Θ, subject to its budget constraint (21), the stochas-
tic changes (22) in its profits, the composition of its income, (23), and the
determination of its relative investment shares, (18), given the arrival rates
{Λjκ,Γj}, the wage w and the consumption price P . In the households’ sta-
tionary equilibrium in which the allocation of resources is invariable across
technologies, noting (8), (10), this maximization yields (see Appendix A):
ljκ = ℓβ for j /∈ Θ,
lj0 = ℓα for j ∈ Θ,
ℓα
ℓβ
= ψ(π)
.
=
[
πγ/2
Πλμσ
]1/ς
,
ψ′ =
ψ
ςπ
> 0, (24)
g =
(2λ log μ)l
αψ/(1− α) + 2
, (25)
ρ+
1− μσ
log μ
g = Δ
(
l, ϕ(α, π)
) .
=
λμσΠ(N − l)
ϕ(α, π) + ϕ(α, π)2l/(N − l)
,
∂Δ/∂l < 0, ∂Δ/∂ϕ < 0. (26)
Result (24) says that with a lower profit π investors spend relatively more in
innovative than imitative R&D (i.e. a higher ℓβ/ℓα). According to (25), the
growth rate g is proportional to labor devoted to R&D, l. Result (26) states
that a household’s subjective discount factor ρ+ 1−μ
σ
log μ
g is in equilibrium equal
to the rate of return to savings, Δ.
5 General equilibrium
When an innovation occurs in an industry, this industry switches from the
set of two-leader to that of one-leader industries, and when an imitation
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occurs in an industry, this switches from the set of one-leader to that of two-
leader industries. In a steady-state equilibrium, every time a new superior-
quality product is discovered in some industry, imitation must occur in some
other industry.7 The rate at which industries leave the group of two-leader
industries k /∈ Θ, β(Λj1 + Λj2)dν, is then equal to the rate at which the
industries leave the group of one-leader industries j ∈ Θ, αΓjdν. This implies
β(Λk1 + Λk2) = αΓj for k /∈ Θ and j ∈ Θ. (27)
Given (14), (24) and (27), one obtains that if π = 0, then Γj = lj0 = ℓα = 0
for j ∈ Θ and g = Λk1 = Λk2 = 0 for k /∈ Θ. In other words, without profits
in the two-leader industries (i.e. π = 0), there is no growth (g = 0). This
result can be rephrased also as follows:
Proposition 1 Some positive proﬁts π > 0 in the two-leader industries are
necessary for growth g > 0.
With non-diversifiable risk, households hold the shares of all innovating firms
in their portfolios. Given this, they have no incentives to invest in imitating
R&D unless there are profits during the innovation race. Without imitation,
all firms will end up in the set of one-leader industries. This means that
there will be no firms to innovate and no growth.
Equations (8), (11), (12), (24) and (27) yield
α
1− α
=
α
β
=
Λj1 + Λj2
Γj
=
λ(l1−ςj1 + l
1−ς
j2 )
γl1−ςj0
=
2λℓ1−ςβ
γℓ1−ςα
=
2λ
γψ
ψς =
πμ−σ
Πψ
= (2λ/γ)1/ς(Πμσ)1/ς−1π1−1/ς . (28)
Inserting this into (25), one obtains that the ratio of the growth rate to labor
devoted to R&D, g/l, falls with a higher profit in the two-leader industries:
g = ǫ(π)l, ǫ(π)
.
=
2λ log μ
μ−σπ/Π+ 2
, ǫ′ < 0. (29)
The two equations (26) and (29) form a system of two unknowns (l, g).
Unfortunately, these results are ambiguous, because an increase in the growth
rate g lowers both a household’s subjective discount factor ρ+ 1−μ
σ
log μ
g and the
7Cf. Segerstrom (1991), p. 817.
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rate of return to savings, Δ, through lower employment l in R&D. For this
reason, I assume the following stability property for the equation (29).8 After
a small perturbation, the actual growth rate of the economy, g, adjusts to its
stationary equilibrium level according to
dg/dν = δ
(
ǫ(π)l − g
)
with δ′ > 0, (30)
where ν is time and δ a diﬀerentiable function. Noting (8), (10), (24) and
(30), and diﬀerentiating the equation (26) totally, one can in equilibrium
with dg/dν = 0 define the function [Appendix B]
g
(
π, ϕ(α, π)
)
,
∂g
∂π
< 0,
∂g
∂ϕ
< 0,
∂g
∂ϕ
∂ϕ
∂β
= −
∂g
∂ϕ
∂ϕ
∂α
< 0,
∂g
∂ϕ
dϕ
dπ
∣∣∣∣
π>π0
> 0,
∂g
∂ϕ
dϕ
dπ
∣∣∣∣
π<π0
< 0,
dg
dπ
∣∣∣∣
π<π0
=
[
∂g
∂π
+
∂g
∂ϕ
dϕ
dπ
]
π<π0
< 0.
(31)
The results (31) can be rephrased as follows:
Proposition 2 The proportion β of industries subject to price competition
is negatively associated with the growth rate g. An increase in product market
competition (i.e. a decrease in π) promotes growth when the initial level of
competition is high enough (i.e. π < π0).
A higher proportion of two-leader industries raises the demand for labor
in production. This decreases labor devoted to R&D and the growth rate.
An increase in product market competition leads to faster growth through
the competition-escaping effect. Households, which hold the shares of both
leaders in their portfolios, attempt to get rid of competition by investing
in R&D in both firms. In the case of successful innovation by either of
the leaders, they get a higher profit from the remaining leader than from
the two leaders before the innovation. On the other hand, an increase in
competition leads to to slower growth through the wage effect as follows.
With competition the leaders charge lower prices, produce more and employ
more labor in production. This transfers labor from R&D into production,
and the growth rate falls. The competition-escaping eﬀect dominates at high
initial levels of product market competition.
8Cf. Dixit (1986), for the use of stability properties in refining comparative statics.
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6 Conclusions
This paper examines a multi-industry economy in which growth is generated
by creative destruction. In each industry, a firm creating the newest tech-
nology by a successful innovative R&D project crowds out the other firms
with older technologies from the market and becomes the first leader of the
industry. A firm creating a copy of the newest technology starts producing
a close substitute for the innovator’s product and establishes an innovation
race with the first leader. Because there is systematic investment risk that
cannot be eliminated by diversification, the households hold the shares of all
firms in their portfolios.
In this paper, I show that an increase in product market competition (as
measured by the elasticity or product substitution) speeds up growth through
the competition-escaping effect. Households, which hold the shares of both
leaders in their portfolios, attempt to get rid of competition by investing in
R&D in both firms. In the case of successful innovation by either of the
leaders, they get a higher profit from the remaining leader than from the two
leaders before the innovation. On the other hand, an increase in competition
hampers growth through the wage effect as follows. With competition the
leaders charge lower prices, produce more and employ more labor in pro-
duction. This transfers labor from R&D into production, and the growth
rate falls. The competition-escaping eﬀect dominates at high initial levels of
competition. In Aghion et al. (1997, 2001), the utility function is linear in
labor so that there is an infinite supply of labor at a given wage. Thus, in
their model there is only the competition-escaping but no wage eﬀect, and
competition is unambiguously growth promoting.
Note that the competition-escaping eﬀect in this paper diﬀers from that
in the earlier product-cycle models which assume diversifiable risk as fol-
lows.9 With diversifiable risk, firms choose their optimal inputs to R&D at
a given market interest rate. In such a case, the two competing leaders in
a market attempt to get rid of each other by investing in R&D. With non-
diversifiable risk, households make investment decisions by purhasing shares
of R&D firms. Thus, they purchase the shares of both leaders in other to
earn higher profit from one leader after a successful innovation by either of
9Cf. [e.g. Aghion et al. (1997, 2001).
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the leaders than from the two leaders before. In both cases, however, the
competition-escaping eﬀect leads to a higher growth rate of the economy.
Mukoyama (2003) argues that in the presence of fully diversifiable risk
firms imitate in order to be able to participate in the innovation race, al-
though during the race they had no profits. I show that this does not hold
with non-diversifiable risk. Because the households hold shares of all innovat-
ing firms in the same portfolios, they have no incentives to invest in imitating
R&D unless there are profits during the innovation race. Mukoyama (2003)
shows that in the presence of diversifiable risk there are cases where the pro-
portion of industries subject to price competition and the growth rate are
positively correlated. I show that with non-diversifiable risk this is vice versa.
An increase in the proportion of industries that have more than one producer
raises the demand for labor in production. This decreases labor devoted to
R&D and the growth rate.
Appendix
A. Results (24)-(25)
I denote:
Ω
(
{sιkυ}, {tk}
)
the value of receiving profits sιkυ from all firms υ in all in-
dustries k using current technology tk.
Ω
(
Πiιjκ, 0, {sι(k =j)υ}, tj + 1, {tk =j}
)
the value of receiving the profit Πiιjκ
from firm κ in industry j /∈ Θ using technology tj +1, but receiving no
profits from the other firm which was a leader in that industry when
technology tj was used, and receiving profits sι(k =j)υ from all firms υ in
other industries k = j with current technology tk.
Ω
(
πiιj1, πiιj2, {sι(k =j)υ}, {tk}
)
the value of receiving profits πiιjκ from firms
κ ∈ {1, 2} in industry j ∈ Θ, but receiving profits sι(k =j)υ from all firms
υ in the other industries k = j with current technology tk.
The Bellman equation associated with the household’s maximization is10
ρΩ
(
{sιkυ}, {tk}
)
= max
Sιj ≥ 0 for all j
Ξι, (32)
10Cf. Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
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where
Ξι
.
= Cσι +
∫
j∈Θ
Γj
[
Ω
(
πiιj1, πiιj1, {sι(k =j)υ}, {tk}
)
− Ω
(
{sιkυ}, {tk}
)]
dj
+
∫
j /∈Θ
∑
κ=1,2
Λjκ
[
Ω
(
Πiιjκ, 0, {sι(k =j)υ}, tj + 1, {tk =j}
)
− Ω
(
{sιkυ}, {tk}
)]
dj.
(33)
Because ∂Cι/∂Sιjκ = −1/P by (21), the first-order conditions are given by
Λjκ
d
dSιjκ
[
Ω
(
Πiιjκ, 0, {sι(k =j)υ}, tj + 1, {tk =j}
)
− Ω
(
{sιkυ}, {tk}
)]
=
σ
P
Cσ−1ι
for j /∈ Θ and κ ∈ {1, 2}, (34)
Γj
d
dSιj0
[
Ω
(
πiιj1, πiιj2, {sι(k =j)υ}, {tk}
)
− Ω
(
{sιkυ}, {tk}
)]
=
σ
P
Cσ−1ι
for j ∈ Θ. (35)
I try the solution that for each household ι the propensity to consume,
hι, and the subjective interest rate rι are independent of income Aι, i.e.
PCι = hιAι and Ω = C
σ
ι /rι. Let us denote variables depending on technology
tk by superscript tk. Since according to (23) income A
{tk}
ι depends directly
on variables {stkιk}, I denote A
{tk}
ι ({s
tk
ιk}). Assuming that hι is invariant across
technologies yields
P {tk}C{tk}ι = hιA
{tk}
ι ({s
tk
ιk}). (36)
The share in the next innovator tj+1 is determined by investment under the
present technology tj, s
tj+1
ιjκ = Πi
tj
ιjκ for j /∈ Θ. The share in the next imitator
is determined by investment under the same technology tj, s
tj
ιjκ = πi
tj
ιjκ for
j ∈ Θ. The value functions are then given by
Ω
(
{sιkυ}, {tk}
)
= Ω
(
πiιj1, πiιj2, {sι(k =j)υ}, {tk}
)
=
1
rι
(
C{tk}ι
)σ
,
Ω
(
Πiιjκ, 0, {sι(k =j)υ}, tj + 1, {tk =j}
)
=
1
rι
(
C
tj+1,{tk =j}
ι
)σ
. (37)
Given this, one obtains
∂Ω
(
{sιkυ}, {tk}
)
∂S
tj
ιj
= 0. (38)
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From (18), (23), (36), (37), s
tj+1
ιjκ = Πi
tj
ιjκ for j /∈ Θ, and s
tj
ιjκ = πi
tj
ιjκ for j ∈ Θ
it follows that
∂s
tj+1
ιjκ
∂i
tj
ιjκ
= Π for j /∈ Θ,
∂s
tj
ιj0
∂i
tj
ιj0
= π for j ∈ Θ,
∂A
tj+1,{tk =j}
ι
∂s
tj+1
ιjκ
=
∂A
{tk}
ι
∂s
tj
ιjκ
= 1,
∂i
tj
ιj0
∂S
tj
ιj0
=
1
w{tk}l
{tk}
j0
for j ∈ Θ,
∂i
tj
ιjκ
∂S
tj
ιjκ
=
1
w{tk}l
{tk}
jκ
for j /∈ Θ,
∂Ω
(
Πiιjκ, 0, {sι(k =j)υ}, tj + 1, {tk =j}
)
∂S
tj
ιjκ
=
σ
rι
(
C
tj+1,{tk =j}
ι
)σ−1 ∂Ctj+1,{tk =j}ι
∂A
tj+1,{tk =j}
ι︸ ︷︷ ︸
hι/P
tj+1,{tk =j}
∂A
tj+1,{tk =j}
ι
∂s
tj+1
ιjκ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
∂s
tj+1
ιjκ
∂i
tj
ιjκ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=π
∂i
tj
ιjκ
∂S
tj
ιjκ
=
Πσhι
(
C
tj+1,{tk =j}
ι
)σ−1
rιP tj+1,{tk =j}
∂i
tj
ιjκ
∂S
tj
ιjκ
=
Πhισ
(
C
tj+1,{tk =j}
ι
)σ−1
rιw{tk}P tj+1,{tk =j}l
{tk}
jκ
for j /∈ Θ, (39)
∂Ω
(
πiιj1, πiιj2, {sι(k =j)υ}, {tk}
)
∂S
tj
ιj0
=
σ
rι
(
C{tk}ι
)σ−1 ∂C{tk}ι
∂A
{tk}
ι︸ ︷︷ ︸
=hι/P {tk}
∂A
{tk}
ι
s
tj
ιj0︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
s
tj
ιj0
∂itιj0︸ ︷︷ ︸
=π
∂itιj0
∂Stιj0
=
πσhι
rιP {tk}
(
C{tk}ι
)σ−1 ∂itιj0
∂Stιj0
=
πhισ
(
C
{tk}
ι
)σ−1
rιw{tk}P {tk}l
{tk}
j0
for j ∈ Θ. (40)
I focus on a stationary equilibrium where the growth rate g and the
allocation of labor, (ljκ, x), are invariant across technologies. Given (2),
(10), (13) and (16), this implies
l
{tk}
jκ = ljκ, x
{tk} = x = N − l, w{tk} = w = x/ϕ,
P {tk}
P tj+1,{tk =j}
=
C
tj+1,{tk =j}
ι
C
{tk}
ι
=
A
tj+1,{tk =j}
ι
A
{tk}
ι
=
ytj+1,{tk =j}
y{tk}
=
Btj+1,{tk =j}
B{tk}
= μ.
(41)
Inserting (14), (33), (36), (37), (41) and g
.
=
∫
j /∈Θ
ljdj into (32) yields
0 =
[
ρ+
∫
j /∈Θ
(Λj1 + Λj2)dj +
∫
j∈Θ
Γjdj
]
Ω
(
{sιkυ}, {tk}
)
−
(
C{tk}ι
)σ
−
∫
j /∈Θ
∑
κ=1,2
ΛjκΩ
(
Πiιjκ, 0, {sι(k =j)υ}, tj + 1, {tk =j}
)
dj
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−∫
j∈Θ
ΓjΩ
(
πiιj1, πiιj2, {sι(k =j)υ}, {tk}
)
dj
=
[
ρ+
∫
j /∈Θ
(Λj1 + Λj2)dj
](C{tk}ι )σ
rι
−
(
C{tk}ι
)σ
−
∫
j /∈Θ
∑
κ=1,2
Λjκ
rι
(
C
{tj+1},{tk =j}
ι
)σ
dj
=
[
ρ+
∫
j /∈Θ
(Λj1 + Λj2)dj
](C{tk}ι )σ
rι
−
(
C{tk}ι
)σ
−
∫
j /∈Θ
∑
κ=1,2
Λjκ
μσ
rι
(
C{tk}ι
)σ
dj
=
1
rι
(
C{tk}ι
)σ[
ρ+ (1− μσ)
∫
j /∈Θ
(Λj1 + Λj2)dj − rι
]
=
1
rι
(
C{tk}ι
)σ[
ρ− rι +
1− μσ
log μ
g
]
.
This equation is equivalent to
rι = ρ+
1− μσ
log μ
g. (42)
Because there is symmetry throughout all households ι, their propensity
to consume is equal, hι = h. This, (17), (19), (21), (23) and (36) yield
wl = w
∫
j∈Θ
lj0dj + w
∫
j /∈Θ
(lj1 + lj2)dj = w
∫
j∈Θ
lj0dj +
∫
j /∈Θ
(lj1 + lj2)dj
=
N∑
ι=1
[∫
j∈Θ
Sιj0dj +
∫
j /∈Θ
(Sιj1 + Sιj2)dj
]
=
N∑
ι=1
(Aι − PCι)
= (1− h)
N∑
ι=1
Aι = (1− h)(1 + wl).
Solving for the propensity to consume, one obtains
hι = h = (1 + wl)
−1. (43)
Given (10) and (16), one obtains the wage
w = ϕ/x = ϕ(α, π)/(N − l). (44)
I define the rate of return to imitative R&D by z
.
= πΓj/(wlj0). Inserting
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this, (9), (11), (12), (38), (39) and (40) into (34) and (35), one obtains
Πhσμσ
(
C
{tk}
ι
)σ−1
λ(
ρ+ 1−μ
σ
log μ
g
)
wP {tk}
=
σΠhιμ
σΛjκ
(
C
{tk}
ι
)σ−1
rιwljκP {tk}
=
σΠhιΛjκ
(
C
tj+1,{tk =j}
ι
)σ−1
rιwljκP
ttj+1,{tk =j}
= Λjκ
d
dSιjκ
Ω
(
Πiιj, {sι(k =j)}, tj + 1, {tk =j}
)
=
σ
P {tk}
(
C{tk}ι
)σ−1
for j /∈ Θ and κ ∈ {1, 2}, (45)
πhσ
(
C
{tk}
ι
)σ−1
γl−ςj0 ℓ
ς
β(
ρ+ 1−μ
σ
log μ
g
)
wP {tk}
=
σh
(
C
{tk}
ι
)σ−1
z
rιwlj0P {tk}
=
σπhιΓj
(
C
{tk}
ι
)σ−1
rιwlj0P {tk}
= Γj
d
dSιj0
Ω
(
{πiιj1, πiιj2, {sιm(k =j)}, {tk}
)
=
σ
P {tk}
(
C{tk}ι
)σ−1
for j ∈ Θ.
(46)
Given equations (45) and (46) and (9), one obtains
ljκ = ℓβ for j /∈ Θ,
lj0 = ℓα for j ∈ Θ,
ℓα
ℓβ
= ψ(π)
.
=
[
πγ/2
Πλμσ
]1/ς
,
ψ′ > 0. (47)
Equations (2), (8), (11), (14), (15), (43), (44), (46) and (47) yield
l =
∫
j /∈Θ
(lj1 + lj2)dj +
∫
j∈Θ
ljdj = ℓβ
∫
j /∈Θ
dj + ℓα
∫
j∈Θ
dj
= αℓα + 2(1− α)ℓβ = [αψ + 2(1− α)]ℓβ,
ℓβ = [αψ + 2(1− α)]
−1l, ℓα = [αψ + 2(1− α)]
−1ψl,
Λjκ = λℓβ = λ[αψ + 2(1− α)]
−1l for j /∈ Θ and κ ∈ {1, 2},
g = (log μ)
∫
j /∈Θ
(Λj1 + Λj2)dj = (2 log μ)(1− α)Λjκ
=
(2λ log μ)(1− α)l
αψ + 2(1− α)
=
(2λ log μ)l
αψ/(1− α) + 2
, (48)
ρ+
1− μσ
log μ
g =
hμσΠΛjκ
wljκ
=
λhμσΠ
w
=
λμσΠ
w(1 + wl)
=
λμσΠ
w + w2l
=
λμσΠ(N − l)
ϕ(α, π) + ϕ(α, π)2l/(N − l)
. (49)
Equations (44), (47), (48) and (49) define (24)-(25).
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B. Results (31)
The equation (26) defines the function l
(
g, ϕ(α, π)
)
with the properties
∂l
∂g
=
1− μσ
log μ︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
/
∂Δ
∂l︸︷︷︸
−
> 0,
∂l
∂ϕ
= −
∂Δ
∂ϕ︸︷︷︸
−
/
∂Δ
∂l︸︷︷︸
−
< 0. (50)
Inserting this into the diﬀerential equation (30) yields
dg/dν = Υ
(
g, π, ϕ(α, π)
) .
= δ
(
ǫ(π)l
(
g, ϕ(α, π)
)
− g
)
with δ′ > 0, (51)
where the stability requires ∂Υ/∂g < 0. Noting (29), (50) and (51), one
obtains
∂Υ
∂π
= δ′ǫ′l < 0,
∂Υ
∂ϕ
= δ′
∂l
∂ϕ
< 0.
Thus, in equilibrium with dg/dν = 0 in (51), one can define the function
g
(
π, ϕ(α, π)
)
,
∂g
∂π
= −
∂Υ
∂π
/
∂Υ
∂g
< 0,
∂g
∂ϕ
= −
∂Υ
∂ϕ
/
∂Υ
∂g
< 0. (52)
The equation (28) defines the proportion of one-leader industries, α, as a
decreasing function of the profit in the two-leader industries, π:
α(π), α′ = α(1− α)(1− 1/ς)/π < 0, lim
pi→0
α = 1. (53)
Finally, given (10), (24) and (53), one obtains that wage expenditure in
production, wx = ϕ, depends on the profit π as follows:
dϕ
dπ
=
∂ϕ
∂α
α′ +
∂ϕ
∂π
= (2π − Π)α′ + 2(α− 1)
= (1− α)
[
(1/ς − 1)(Π− 2π)α(π)− 2π
]
/π.
This implies
dϕ
dπ
< 0 for π > π0,
dϕ
dπ
> 0 for π < π0, lim
π→Π/2
dϕ
dπ
= α− 1 < 0,
lim
π→0
dϕ
dπ
=
1− α
π
lim
π→0, α→1
[(1
ς
− 1
)
(Π− 2π
)
α− 2π
]
=
1− α
π
(1
ς
− 1
)
Π > 0,
(54)
where the constant π0 ∈ (1, μ) is defined by the equation
(1/ς − 1)(Π/π0 − 2)α(π0) = 2.
Inserting (54) into (52) yields (31).
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